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Author : Celeste J. Ward
Publisher : Unknown
Page : 12 pages
File Size : 40,9 Mb
Release : 2005
Category : Civil society
ISBN : UOM:39015063093531
Author : Celeste J. Ward
Publisher : Unknown
Page : 0 pages
File Size : 46,8 Mb
Release : 2022
Category : Electronic
ISBN : OCLC:1396919980
Author : Robert Perito
Publisher : Unknown
Page : 16 pages
File Size : 43,5 Mb
Release : 2005
Category : Coalition Provisional Authority
ISBN : PURD:32754077956732
Author : Robert Perito
Publisher : Unknown
Page : 0 pages
File Size : 43,6 Mb
Release : 2005
Category : Internal security
ISBN : OCLC:58918748
Author : Anne Ellen Henderson
Publisher : Unknown
Page : 20 pages
File Size : 42,7 Mb
Release : 2005
Category : Coalition Provisional Authority
ISBN : PURD:32754077956724
Author : Robert M. Perito
Publisher : Unknown
Page : 0 pages
File Size : 42,5 Mb
Release : 2022
Category : Electronic
ISBN : OCLC:1396924954
Author : Andrew Rathmell,Olga Oliker,Terrence K. Kelly,David Brannan,Keith Crane
Publisher : Rand Corporation
Page : 122 pages
File Size : 54,5 Mb
Release : 2006-01-05
Category : Political Science
ISBN : 9780833040909
From May 2003 to June 28, 2004 (when it handed over authority to the Iraqi Interim Government), the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) worked to field Iraqi security forces and to develop security sector institutions. This book-all of whose authors were advisors to the CPA-breaks out the various elements of Iraq's security sector, including the defense, interior, and justice sectors, and assesses the CPA's successes and failures.
Author : United States. Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction
Publisher : Government Printing Office
Page : 484 pages
File Size : 51,9 Mb
Release : 2009
Category : History
ISBN : PURD:32754081154407
Product Description: The billions of dollars expended in Iraq constitute the largest relief and reconstruction exercise in American history. SIGIR's lessons learned capping report characterizes this effort in four phases (pre-war to ORHA, CPA, post-CPA/Negroponte era, and Khalilzad, Crocker, and the Surge). From this history, SIGIR forwards a series of conclusions and recommendations for Congress to consider when organizing for the next post-conflict reconstruction situation. Over the past five years, the United States has provided nearly fifty billion dollars for the relief and reconstruction of Iraq. This unprecedented rebuilding program, implemented after the March 2003 invasion, was developed to restore Iraq's essential services, build Iraq's security forces, create a market-based economy, and establish a democratic government--all in pursuit of U.S. interests in a stable and free Iraq. Did the U.S. rebuilding program achieve its objectives? Was the money provided well-spent or wasted? What lessons have we learned from the experience? Hard Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction Experience, a report from the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR), answers these and other important questions by presenting a comprehensive history of the U.S. program, chiefly derived from SIGIR's body of extensive oversight work in Iraq, hundreds of interviews with key figures involved with the reconstruction program, and thousands of documents evidencing the reconstruction work that was - or was not - done. The report examines the limited pre-war planning for reconstruction, the shift from a large infrastructure program to a more community-based one, and the success of the Surge in 2007 and beyond. Hard Lessons concludes that the U.S. government did not have the structure or resources in place to execute the mammoth relief and reconstruction plan it took on in 2003. The lessons learned from this experience create a basis for reviewing and reforming the U.S. approach to contingency relief and reconstruction operations.
Author : James Dobbins,Seth G. Jones,Benjamin Runkle,Siddharth Mohandas
Publisher : Rand Corporation
Page : 410 pages
File Size : 40,6 Mb
Release : 2009-04-01
Category : Political Science
ISBN : 9780833047243
Focuses on the activities of the Coalition Provisional Authority during the first year of the occupation of Iraq. Based on interviews and nearly 100,000 never-before-released documents from CPA archives, the book recounts and evaluates the efforts of the United States and its coalition partners to restore public services, counter a burgeoning insurgency, and create the basis for representative government.
Author : Celeste J. Ward
Publisher : DIANE Publishing
Page : 12 pages
File Size : 50,6 Mb
Release : 2008-09
Category : Technology & Engineering
ISBN : 9781437904208
This report is a product of the U.S. Institute of Peace¿s Iraq Experience Project. It is the third of three reports examining important lessons identified in Iraq prior to the country¿s transition to sovereignty in June 2004 and is based on extensive interviews with 113 officials, soldiers, and contractors who served there. This report is focused specifically on governance in Iraq under the Coalition Provisional Authority. The other two reports examine security and reconstruction, respectively. These reports are intended for use as training aids in programs that prepare individuals for service in peace and stability operations, so that lessons identified in Iraq may be translated into lessons learned by those assigned to future missions.
Author : Anonim
Publisher : Unknown
Page : 116 pages
File Size : 48,6 Mb
Release : 2005
Category : Electronic
ISBN : OCLC:1050606223
Soon after the coalition's occupation of Iraq began in April 2003, it became evident that prewar assumptions about the security situation that would follow the ouster of Saddam Hussein had been unduly optimistic. The environment was not benign -- it was deteriorating. Iraqi security forces had largely disintegrated, and those that remained were incapable of responding to rising criminality and political violence. In this environment, the coalition confronted three security imperatives: (1) to restore order and neutralize insurgents and terrorists; (2) to rebuild Iraqi security forces, which could eventually take on responsibility for Iraq's security; and (3) to build security sector institutions, such as national security management institutions, the interior and defense ministries, and the justice sector, to ensure that the Iraqi security sector could be an effective bulwark for a democratic Iraq in the future. At the time that the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) handed over authority to the Iraqi Interim Government (IIG) on June 28, 2004, it was clear that the coalition had made little progress in the first task. Insurgent and terrorist violence was escalating, organized crime was flourishing, and the security situation was threatening both the political transition and the reconstruction program. The coalition's record on the second and third tasks, however, is somewhat less simply categorized. From April 2003, the coalition embarked on efforts to rapidly field Iraqi security forces and to build security sector institutions. This effort was broad in scope, but its implementation was patchy, its results were varying, and its ultimate success or failure remains difficult to determine. This report focuses on efforts to build both forces and institutions in Iraq. It provides a historical record of the coalition's experience and seeks, insofar as is possible at this early stage, to draw lessons from the successes and failures of that experience.
Author : Robert M. Perito
Publisher : DIANE Publishing
Page : 16 pages
File Size : 43,7 Mb
Release : 2008-10
Category : Political Science
ISBN : 9781437903041
Author : Alasdair Roberts
Publisher : NYU Press
Page : 231 pages
File Size : 48,7 Mb
Release : 2008-02-01
Category : Political Science
ISBN : 9780814776254
When the Bush presidency began to collapse, pundits were quick to tell a tale of the “imperial presidency” gone awry, a story of secretive, power-hungry ideologues who guided an arrogant president down the road to ruin. But the inside story of the failures of the Bush administration is both much more complex and alarming, says leading policy analyst Alasdair Roberts. In the most comprehensive, balanced view of the Bush presidency to date, Roberts portrays a surprisingly weak president, hamstrung by bureaucratic, constitutional, cultural and economic barriers and strikingly unable to wield authority even within his own executive branch. The Collapse of Fortress Bush shows how the president fought—and lost—key battles with the defense and intelligence communities. From Homeland Security to Katrina, Bush could not coordinate agencies to meet domestic threats or disasters. Either the Bush administration refused to exercise authority, was thwarted in the attempt to exercise authority, or wielded authority but could not meet the test of legitimacy needed to enact their goals. Ultimately, the vaunted White House discipline gave way to public recriminations among key advisers. Condemned for secretiveness, the Bush administration became one of the most closely scrutinized presidencies in the modern era. Roberts links the collapse of the Bush presidency to deeper currents in American politics and culture, especially a new militarism and the supremacy of the Reagan-era consensus on low taxes, limited government, and free markets. Only in this setting was it possible to have a “total war on terrorism” in which taxes were reduced, private consumption was encouraged, and businesses were lightly regulated. A balanced, incisive account by a skilled observer of U.S. government, The Collapse of Fortress Bush turns the spotlight from the powerful cabal that launched the war in Iraq to tell a much more disturbing story about American power and the failure of executive leadership.
Author : Stuart W. Bowen
Publisher : DIANE Publishing
Page : 508 pages
File Size : 40,5 Mb
Release : 2009-05
Category : Technology & Engineering
ISBN : 9781437912746
A combination of poor planning, weak oversight and greed cheated U.S. taxpayers and undermined American forces in Iraq and Afghanistan. U.S. taxpayers have paid nearly $51 billion for projects in Iraq, including training the Iraqi army and police and rebuilding Iraq's oil, electric, justice, health and transportation sectors. Many of the projects did not succeed, partly because of violence in Iraq and friction between U.S. officials in Washington and Iraqi officials in Baghdad. The U.S. gov¿t. "was neither prepared for nor able to respond quickly to the ever-changing demands" of stabilizing Iraq and then rebuilding it. This report reviews the problems in the war effort, which the Bush admin. claimed would cost $2.4 billion. Charts and tables.
Author : United States. Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction
Publisher : Government Printing Office
Page : 480 pages
File Size : 53,9 Mb
Release : 2009
Category : History
ISBN : MINN:30000008510715
Product Description: The billions of dollars expended in Iraq constitute the largest relief and reconstruction exercise in American history. SIGIR's lessons learned capping report characterizes this effort in four phases (pre-war to ORHA, CPA, post-CPA/Negroponte era, and Khalilzad, Crocker, and the Surge). From this history, SIGIR forwards a series of conclusions and recommendations for Congress to consider when organizing for the next post-conflict reconstruction situation. Over the past five years, the United States has provided nearly fifty billion dollars for the relief and reconstruction of Iraq. This unprecedented rebuilding program, implemented after the March 2003 invasion, was developed to restore Iraq's essential services, build Iraq's security forces, create a market-based economy, and establish a democratic government--all in pursuit of U.S. interests in a stable and free Iraq. Did the U.S. rebuilding program achieve its objectives? Was the money provided well-spent or wasted? What lessons have we learned from the experience? Hard Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction Experience, a report from the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR), answers these and other important questions by presenting a comprehensive history of the U.S. program, chiefly derived from SIGIR's body of extensive oversight work in Iraq, hundreds of interviews with key figures involved with the reconstruction program, and thousands of documents evidencing the reconstruction work that was - or was not - done. The report examines the limited pre-war planning for reconstruction, the shift from a large infrastructure program to a more community-based one, and the success of the Surge in 2007 and beyond. Hard Lessons concludes that the U.S. government did not have the structure or resources in place to execute the mammoth relief and reconstruction plan it took on in 2003. The lessons learned from this experience create a basis for reviewing and reforming the U.S. approach to contingency relief and reconstruction operations.
